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To start as we don’t mean to go on – let us begin, in true academic style, with a fairly lengthy 
quotation, taken here from the Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780:  
 
Based on many reports describing the policy and practices conducted in the 
former Yugoslavia, “ethnic cleansing” has been carried out by means of murder, 
torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual 
assaults, confinement of civilian population on ghetto area, forcible removal, 
displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or 
threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of 
property. Those practices constitute crimes against humanity and can be 
assimilated to specific war crimes. Furthermore, such acts could also fall within 
the meaning of the Genocide Convention.1 
 
The reason for opening with this excerpt is that it directly speaks to the definitional confusion 
that has surrounded the term “ethnic cleansing” ever since its introduction in the context of 
mass violence in the former Yugoslavia. That acts of ethnic cleansing might “constitute 
crimes against humanity”, be “assimilated to specific war crimes” and/or “fall within the 
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meaning of the Genocide Convention” indicates what to those who subscribe to the value of 
specificity of legal definitions must appear an alarming lack of clarity. Such definitional 
imprecision is by no means a mere matter for ivory-tower (legal) intellectuals, but can – and 
herein lies the premise and burden of the present lecture – have serious repercussions in terms 
of inhibiting the effective recognition and prevention of genocide. 
 
Objections to the use of the term ethnic cleansing have long-since been manifold. It has been 
dismissed as too hazy and vague – a product of journalistic verbiage rather than proper legal 
reflection. The apparently ‘positive’ connotations of cleansing (cleanliness, purification etc.) 
have been considered an inapt and immoral signifier of violence and brutality. The term has, 
moreover, also been seen as a dangerous euphemism for covering up the full horror of 
genocide. 
 
All such criticisms have their obvious justifications. For what follows here, the latter point is, 
though, particularly salient. To outline the core issue in bare terms: the argument is that usage 
of the term ethnic cleansing masks – or can mask – the atrocities of genocidal violence, and 
that this, in turn, obstructs recognition of such instances. Ethnic cleansing thus represents, in 
this optic, a rhetorical appellation of greatest advantage to either – or both – genocidaires 
keen to avoid being held to full account for their actions, or for observers who lack the will to 
confront and stop genocide.  
 
Should we start to dig around at this issue, it ought not take us too long to recognise the 
absence of an accepted legal definition of ethnic cleansing as a key factor – probably the key 
factor – that facilitates such cowardly avoidance. Ethnic cleansing continues to occupy a 
peculiar grey-zone between recognition and non-recognition in international law. On the one 
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hand, the term has entered into legal usage: it is not only referenced in the Final Report of the 
Commission of Experts cited above, but also in a number of the UN’s Security Resolutions 
relating to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. On the other, however, it still has not been 
codified in international law, and has usually – often in a fairly ad hoc manner – been 
characterised as a particular form of other previously defined crimes (i.e. crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, genocide). The disjunction here is striking, and in view of such, we 
might agree with the verdict of Blum, Stanton, Sagi and Richter that it is “ironic that the UN 
itself adopted a euphemism invented by Milosevic, an accused perpetrator of genocide, 
despite its never having been formally defined or recognized as a term with specific legal 
status and mandated obligations”.2 The briefest of glances at the work of the ICTY reveals, 
moreover, the footprint of this inconsonance. The case law of the Tribunal has, time and 
again, made mention of practices of ethnic cleansing, though seldom as an act in and of itself 
– references to such acts have usually been used to supply background context to cases or 
else evidence of other related crimes. To cite just a couple of examples that attest to this: in 
the Vasiljević case, the Trial Chamber associated ethnic cleansing with the practice of crimes 
against humanity;3 both the Krstić and Nikolić Trial Chambers, meanwhile, bracketed ethnic 
cleansing to genocide.4 That the term invariably appears, in court proceedings, within 
quotation marks also provides a stark visual reminder of its uncertain status within the 
parameters of international law. We might recall, moreover, that the defence in the Kovacevic 
case openly used the absence of a legal definition to object to the prosecutor’s use of the 
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term, pointedly observing that it “does not exist in [the] Genocide Convention or in the 
international customary law.”5  
 
The overarching point here can, again, be fairly simply made. The current status of ethnic 
cleansing within international law – or, rather, its lack of clear status – breeds confusion 
rather than certainty and is inimical to a just and efficient recognition of genocide. To resolve 
this, we might, as far as I can see, proceed along one of two pathways. The one would be to 
eschew the term entirely in legal debate and discourse. This is an argument that has been put 
forward by several parties, and is obviously not without merit – the term, as it currently exists 
in its vague formulation, quite feasibly does more harm than good. The other option, 
meanwhile – and that for which I intend here to plead – would be to work towards a proper 
legal classification and qualification of ethnic cleansing within the framework of international 
law.  
 
There is neither the space nor the inclination here for unfolding the full legal reasoning for 
such a claim. Essentially, it rests with the view that ethnic cleansing, if properly codified in 
international law, would provide a useful category for defining a specific set of violent 
practices that, while perhaps similar to genocide (and other international crimes) in several 
respects, differ in terms of both the physical acts and, above all, intentionality. Introducing a 
new classification of ethnic cleansing as an independent crime with its own specific actus 
reus and mens rea would, in my view, not only help to close off a potentially troubling 
loophole in current international law provisions, but also allow for a more precise 
understanding and implementation of applicable definitions of genocide, crimes against 
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humanity and war crimes – all of which would aid the goal, to which we all surely subscribe, 
of an optimally just and effective legal response to instances of mass violence.  
 
In terms of upholding this claim, I wish here to focus attention fairly selectively on just a 
couple of points relating to the difference between ethnic cleansing and genocide. For it is in 
relation to this particular pairing that the greatest controversy persists, with many 
commentators, critics and experts – both academic and non-academic – arguing for an 
essential equivalency between the two. Compelling evidence to the contrary can, however, be 
gleaned from several key sources. One such would be the documentation of the drafting 
history of the Genocide Convention itself, which reveals a very clear and conscious decision 
to limit applicability to ‘physical destruction’. In the supplementary comments to the initial 
Secretariat draft, we find clear expression of the fact that the proposed definition of genocide 
does not cover “certain acts which may result in the total or partial destruction of a group of 
human beings […], namely […] mass displacements of population” and, a little later, the 
confirmation that such mass displacement “does not constitute genocide”. In other words, 
those practices we now commonly associate with ethnic cleansing were expressly excluded 
from the conventional definition of genocide. Despite the developments brought forth by the 
case law of the ICTY and the ICTR, moreover, there is scant evidence to support any 
suggestion of a widening to cover practices of displacement. On the contrary, the proceedings 
of the ICTY, too, (as the body that has been most heavily involved in the punishment of 
crimes associated with ethnic cleansing) militate against any suggestion of sameness: there 
have been a number of occasions on which the Tribunal has noted and upheld how the 
practice of ethnic cleansing does not share the dolus specialis of genocide – that is, the 
specific “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. 
Again, we might pull out a few examples to illustrate this: the Trial Chamber in the Tadic 
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case from 1997 stated, for instance, that Serb forces had pursued a “practice of ethnic 
cleansing” so as to achieve “the redistribution of populations, by force if necessary, in the 
course of achieving a Greater Serbia”, yet made no reference to genocide. Similar verdicts 
were reached in both Krstić and Sikirika et al., where the accused were adjudged not have 
acted with the specific genocidal intent and thus not to be liable for charges of genocide. The 
picture that emerges from the ICTY case law, with regards to ethnic cleansing, is thus of a 
distinct set of practices geared towards the removal of a particular group from a given 
territory – without the (genocidal) intent to physically exterminate the target the group. The 
ICJ has, moreover, reasserted this viewpoint in its judgment on the applicability of the 
Genocide Convention to the situation in Bosnia, openly stating that the practices of 
deportation or displacement commonly associated with ethnic cleansing do not, even if 
pursued via force, equate to the destruction of a particular group. Thus it concludes that 
despite the obvious similarities observed by the ICTY, notably in the Krstić case, between 
policies of genocide and ethnic cleansing respectively, a clear distinction must be made 
between physical destruction (genocide), on the one hand, and displacement or expulsion of a 
group (ethnic cleansing), on the other.    
 
The reason for citing such instances here is that they supply clear legal guidance on the 
fundamental difference in terms of intentionality between ethnic cleansing and genocide. As 
such, it seems apparent that this distinction should be acknowledged, maintained and set 
down in as concrete terms as possible. Thus we can argue that it is not, in fact, the 
introduction of the concept of ethnic cleansing into popular, academic and legal discourse 
that muddies the waters, as has been frequently claimed, but rather the tendency to ignore, 
whether willingly or unwillingly, the established difference between ethnic cleansing and 
genocide, as it has been framed by various relevant international legal instruments. 
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Just to try and unpack this question of differences and similarities a little further: an 
additional reason why a standardised definition of ethnic cleansing may be especially 
valuable in aiding recognition and prevention is that practices of displacement and removal 
can often serve as a precursor to full-blown genocide. History provides a number of 
precedents, and I think we can forego examples at this juncture. Analysis of the manner in 
which ethnic cleansing may move towards genocide is, in and of itself, somewhat fraught and 
carries the risk of slipping into its own definitional quagmire, precisely because of the 
importance of – and difficulties in – establishing intent. The key question to assess, or to try 
to assess, here is whether practices of ethnic cleansing are consciously directed towards 
genocidal ends, in which case they can be seen as being pursuant to the act of genocide itself, 
or whether they carry an effect that furthers genocidal policy without embodying the specific 
intent to destroy? This question is easy to pose, of course, but far more onerous to actually 
answer.  
 
Such difficulties notwithstanding, this understanding of the manner in which ethnic cleansing 
may bleed into genocide, or possibly even serve as an early warning of the latter, represents, 
in my view, the most useful model for conceptualising the relationship between the two 
practices. Ethnic cleansing and genocide are not coterminous, and should not be regarded as 
such. Rather, they occupy distinct positions on a sliding scale or spectrum of violence, 
marked by a significant different in the intentionality of the act. As William Schabas has put 
it, genocide is often the last resort of the frustrated ethnic cleanser; in other words, genocidal 
killings frequently emerge when earlier plans for displacement are thwarted or fail – as a 
radicalised means of expediting the initial aim of the removal of a particular group from a 
given territory. This is not, however, to rule out the possibility of such policies also being 
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undertaken as part of a pre-conceived genocidal plan. Here is not the place to dwell on this 
point at any length; suffice it to say that there is much scope for extended – probably book-
length – analysis on the matter. For present purposes, we might simply note how both 
dynamics suggest something of the intricate relations between ethnic cleansing and genocide. 
Crucially, however – and I will dare to reiterate the point at the risk of being accused of over-
egging it – the distinction between the two remains and rests squarely with the question of 
overarching intent, which ought to be fully acknowledged in relevant legal provisions.  
 
Prior to drawing to a close, a brief word on the practicalities of introducing a new legal 
definition of ethnic cleansing seems warranted. For theorising is all well and good, but the 
key focus of our energies ought to be on working towards making practicable changes that 
further the cause of recognition and prevention. On a basic level, the qualification of ethnic 
cleansing as an independent crime would necessitate the inclusion of a new definition in a 
separate article within the ICC Statute. This would present no great hurdle; such emendations 
are foreseen by Article 123 that reads:  
 
1. Seven years after the entry into force of this Statute the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations shall convene a Review Conference to consider any 
amendments to this Statute. Such review may include, but is not limited to, the 
list of crimes contained in article 5. The Conference shall be open to those 
participating in the Assembly of States Parties and on the same conditions. 
2. At any time thereafter, at the request of a State Party and for the purposes set 
out in paragraph 1, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, upon 
approval by a majority of States Parties, convene a Review Conference. […] 
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The exact procedures for passing such an amendment need not hold us up here; while there 
are various formalities to be observed, the provisions of the Statute are such that they would 
allow for the implementation of such a change without any great delay. To put it in blunt 
terms: the complexities of formal processes would not supply any kind of reason for deciding 
against making such an amendment. And inasmuch as introducing such a new definition 
would not, on account of the principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege, offer the 
opportunity for securing justice for past instances of ethnic cleansing, it would provide an 
important instrument for confronting future instances.  
 
It is at this point that I will finish. To sum up, my argument here proceeded from the view 
that the current haziness surrounding the legal status of the term ethnic cleansing works 
counter to just and effective recognition and prevention to genocide. In part, this stems from a 
general conviction of the need for definitional precision in international law; first and 
foremost, however, it derives from the specific gravity of the issues at play in relation to 
instances of mass violence. Having briefly outlined the problems that current uncertainties 
harbour, I then, in the second part of the lecture, have made the case for a standardised 
recognition of difference between ethnic cleansing and genocide, and a new legal definition 
of the former as the most promising way of overcoming such difficulties.  
 
Such changes would, I am convinced, make a vitally significant contribution to 
understanding and practice in international law, for at least four key reasons. First, by 
codifying a precise definition that strips away the instability that presently attaches to the 
term, they would help to secure effective accountability for acts of ethnic cleansing. Second, 
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they would also – and quite contrary to common fears – aid, rather than hinder, the 
recognition of genocidal instances: if the conditions of ethnic cleansing were set down in 
clear, legal terms, it would be less likely that perpetrators of genocide would attempt to seek 
refuge behind the defence of ‘only’ being guilt of cleansing. Third, stipulating specific 
criminal penalties for acts of ethnic cleansing would help further challenge discourses of 
denial and impunity, and ensure that perpetrators face full justice. Fourth and finally, legal 
recognition of ethnic cleansing as an independent crime might also serve the ends of effective 
transitional justice mechanisms by securing redress for victims and ensuring widespread 
recognition for their suffering. In view of such, I will close with an encouraging appeal for 
ongoing engagement in the task of establishing greater definitional clarity on such matters as 
a vital step in furthering the march towards effective recognition, prevention – and indeed 
prosecution – of those most harrowing instances of mass violence that cut to the core of 
common humanity.   
 
